The main purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of the fuzzy core of an exchange economy with a heterogeneous divisible commodity in which preferences of individuals are given by nonadditive utility functions defined on a -algebra of admissible pieces of the total endowment of the commodity. The problem is formulated as the partitioning of a measurable space among finitely many individuals. Applying the Yosida-Hewitt decomposition theorem, we also demonstrate that partitions in the fuzzy core are supportable by prices in L 1 .
Introduction
Cooperative fuzzy games proposed by Aubin [2, 3] allow for partial participation of individuals in coalitions. In defining the fuzzy core of exchange economies with homogeneous divisible commodities, individuals contribute only some portions of their initial endowments to coalitions they belong to. That is, a fuzzy coalition unlike the classical (crisp) coalitions, does not necessarily require its participants to contribute the whole of their initial endowments. A remarkable result for exchange economies established by Aubin states that under the standard assumptions of continuous, convex preferences the fuzzy core and the set of Walrasian allocations coincide (see also [12, 14] ).
In this paper we study the fuzzy core of an exchange economy with a heterogeneous divisible commodity in which preferences of individuals are given by set functions defined in a -algebra of admissible pieces of the total endowment of the commodity. Following the traditions of fair division literature along the lines of Dubins and Spanier [9] , a heterogeneous divisible commodity is modeled as a nonatomic finite measure space. The total endowment of the heterogeneous commodity is metaphorically called a "cake" in this literature and the problem of fair division consists in partitioning the cake among a finite number of individuals according some criteria of fairness and efficiency.
A common assumption in the theory of fair division is that the preferences of each individual are represented by a nonatomic probability measure. Under this additive utility hypothesis, Lyapunov's convexity theorem (see [19] ) guarantees the convexity and compactness of the utility possibility set, crucial to establishing the existence and characterization of various solutions. However, here we assume preferences to be represented by nonadditive utility functions; hence the utility possibility set does not necessarily possess these properties. The utility functions assumed here contain concave measures introduced by Sagara and Vlach [21] [22] [23] .
Hüsseinov [15, 17] and Sagara and Vlach [24] proved the existence of the core with nonadditive evaluations for exchange economies with heterogeneous divisible commodity under diverse assumptions. The corresponding result for the case of the fuzzy core is not straightforward; an adequate notion of fuzzy improvement must reflect awareness of agents of the bounds of the available heterogeneous divisible commodity. We propose here a such notion of the fuzzy improvement and the fuzzy core.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we present a representation result for concave measures, stating that an arbitrary concave measure can be represented as a composition of a concave function and a finitedimensional nonatomic vector measure. From this characterization we derive the continuity of concave measures at the measurable set whose vector measure lies in the interior of Lyapunov's set. We also provide a core representation theorem for nonatomic vector measure games along the lines of Einy et al. [11] .
Section 3 is devoted to the formulation of the fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy core. To this end, we focus our attention on the case where the single heterogeneous divisible commodity possesses a finite number of attributes, which can be evaluated objectively in terms of finite-dimensional nonatomic vector measures. We define the notions of the fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy core in an exchange economy with a heterogeneous divisible commodity, where each individual has a utility function represented by a nonadditive set function.
The main result of this paper, Theorem 4.2 on the existence of the fuzzy core, is stated in Section 4. To prove this theorem, we extend the commodity space from the set of measurable sets to the set of measurable functions taking values in the unit interval along the lines of Akin [1] , Dall'Aglio [7] and Dvoretsky et al. [10] . If f in L ∞ is a characteristic function of a measurable set A, then an individual possessing f is fully entitled to set A and to nothing else. Thus, we can treat allocations in the extended economy with an L ∞ -commodity space, which can be embedded into the framework of Bewley [5, 6] . We prove the existence of the fuzzy core of this extended economy by constructing a nontransferrable utility (NTU) game and showing that it satisfies the assumptions of Scarf's core existence theorem (see [25] ). Exploiting a technique from Lindenstrauss [18] , the existence of the fuzzy core in the original exchange economy follows from the observation that the extreme points in the fuzzy core of the extended economy are indeed measurable partitions.
Section 5 deals with the supportability of efficient partitions by prices. The argument is based on the effective use of the separation theorem under the convexity assumption. We demonstrate that partitions in the fuzzy core are supportable by prices in L 1 , applying the Yosida-Hewitt decomposition theorem (see [26] ), which is by now a standard method, having been established by Bewley [5, 6] .
Appendix provides a supplementary result on the extension of continuous, quasiconcave, strictly monotonic functions on a compact convex subset of the nonnegative orthant to the entire domain.
Representation and continuity of concave measures

Representation of concave measures
Let ( , F) be a measurable space with a -algebra F of subsets of a nonempty set . A measure on F is nonatomic if, for every A ∈ F with (A) > 0, there exists E ∈ F with E ⊂ A such that 0 < (E) < (A). For nonatomic finite measures 1 , . . . , m , we denote by = ( 1 , . . . , m ) an R m -valued vector measure. Lyapunov's convexity theorem asserts that the range R( ) of is a compact and convex set in R m (see [19] ).
For an arbitrarily given A ∈ F and t ∈ [0, 1], we define the family K t (A) of measurable subsets of A by: [23] ).
The notion of concave measures on -algebras presented in the following definition bears an obvious resemblance to that of concave functions on real vector spaces. We extend here the definition of Sagara and Vlach [21] [22] [23] to the vector measure case. Definition 2.1. A set function : F → R is a concave measure if (∅) = 0 and there exists a finite-dimensional nonatomic vector measure such that for every A, B ∈ F and t ∈ [0, 1], we have
When the underlying vector measure is for the concave measure , we say that is a -concave measure.
The following result presents a useful representation of concave measures. Summing these inequalities up we will have an inequality where the left and right hand sides are the same. Therefore, all the inequalities in the above are in fact equalities. It follows from this observation that (A) = (B).
The converse implication that = • is a concave measure immediately follows from the concavity of and (0) = 0. ç
Recall that a set function :
The next example is due to Sagara and Vlach [24] . 
is submodular.
The equivalence in the example is not true for the vector measure case. Indeed, for m = 2, one can construct an example in which there exists a continuous concave function with (0) = 0 such that is not -concave. For details, see Sagara and Vlach [21] . Continuous functions on (F , d ) arise in a natural way from the set functions on F. The following definition is a straightforward generalization of Sagara and Vlach [21, 22] to the vector measure case.
Continuity of concave measures
When is -continuous at every element of F we say that is -continuous.
The -continuity of set functions on F is stronger than the continuity of those in the measure-theoretic sense: is
We denote by int R( ) and bd R( ) the interior of R( ) and the boundary of R( ), respectively.
Corollary 2.1. Every -concave measure is -continuous at every A ∈ F with (A) ∈ int R( ).
Proof. By Theorem 2.1, any concave measure is of the form = • , where
is continuous on the interior of its domain as a concave function. ç
We denote by ba( , F) the space of bounded, finitely additive, signed measures on F. A set function : F → R is a game if (∅) = 0. A feasible payoff of a game is an element in ba( , F) satisfying ( ) = ( ). The core of a game is defined by
that is, the core is the set of feasible payoffs upon which no coalition can improve.
Recall that a supergradient of a concave function :
The superdifferential * (x) of at x is the set of supergradients of at x.
Theorem 2.2. If : F → R is a -concave measure that is -continuous at , then there exists a concave function
: R( ) → R with (0) = 0 such that:
For proving the theorem, we will need the following result by Einy et al. [11] .
Lemma 2.1. Let be a finite-dimensional nonatomic vector measure and : R( ) → R be a concave function with (0) = 0 that is continuous at ( ). Then the core of the game = • is given by (2.1).
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Let be a -concave measure that is -continuous at . Then = • for some concave function on R( ) by Theorem 2.1. Since the -continuity of = • at implies the continuity at in the sense that (A q ) → ( ) for every sequence {A q } in F with A q ↑ , the result is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.1. ç Theorem 2.2 involves a "core representation" result for -concave measures. Indeed, the core of a -concave measure = • that is -continuous at can be characterized by the local behavior of the superdifferential of at ( ). This conforms with a similar characterization of the core of a game with the form = • obtained by Einy et al. [11] under the alternative continuity hypothesis.
Fuzzy coalitions in exchange economies
Partitioning of a measurable space
The problem of dividing a heterogeneous commodity among a finite number of individuals is formulated as partitioning a measurable space ( , F). Here, set is a heterogeneous divisible commodity, and -algebra F of subsets of describes the collection of possible pieces of . There are m attributes for the heterogeneous divisible commodity , each of which has a cardinal evaluation represented by a nonatomic finite measure k on ( , F) for k = 1, ... , m. We assume in the sequel that = ( 1 , ... , m ) is a nonatomic vector measure such that its component measures are mutually absolutely continuous.
There are n individuals, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, with the set N = {1, . . . , n} of all individuals, whose preferences on F are given by utility functions i : F → R for i ∈ N . A partition of is an ordered n-tuple (A 1 , ... , A n ) of mutually disjoint elements A 1 , . . . , A n in F whose union is , where each A i is a piece of the cake assigned to individual i. Let individual i be initially endowed with i ∈ F for i ∈ N . So ( 1 , ... , n ) is an initial partition of . An exchange economy E = ( , F), i , i i∈N for the partitioning problem under study is the primitive consisting of a common consumption set ( , F) and the individuals' profile of initial endowments i and utility functions i .
We formulate partial participation of individuals to coalitions as proposed by Aubin [2, 3] . A nonzero vector = ( 1 , ... , n ) in the unit cube [0, 1] n is called a fuzzy coalition, whose component i ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree of participation of individual i in this coalition. For each nonempty set S ⊂ N , a fuzzy coalition with support S is a vector
for each i ∈ S and S i = 0 otherwise; S is the set of 'active individuals' in the fuzzy coalition S . The vector e S in {0, 1} n defined as e S i = 1 for each i ∈ S and e S i = 0 otherwise is called a crisp coalition, and is identified with an ordinary (nonfuzzy) coalition S.
An e S -partition is simply said to be an S-partition.
It follows from the definition that an S-partition ( A 1 , ... , A n ) satisfies the coalitional feasibility constraint character wise, that is k i∈S
A partition that cannot be improved upon by any fuzzy coalition is a fuzzy core partition. 
Allocations in L ∞ -spaces
Define = m k=1 k . Let L ∞ ( , F,∈ L ∞ ( , F, ) the characteristic function of A ∈ F. Let X = { f ∈ L ∞ ( , F, ) | 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, -a.e.}. Then, X is a weakly* compact, convex subset of L ∞ ( , F, ). We identify F with the subset of characteristic functions in X . An n-tuple ( f 1 , ... , f n ) of elements in L ∞ ( , F, ) is an allocation of if n i=1 f i = 1 and f i ∈ X for each i ∈ N . Note that ( A 1 , . . . , A n )
is a partition of if and only if
n i=1 A i = 1. We denote by A the set of allocations of .
. This extension is indeed well defined because R( ) coincides with the set { ( f )| f ∈ X } ⊂ R m by Lyapunov's convexity theorem. An exchange economy E = X , i ,ˆ i i∈N for the allocation problem is the primitive consisting of a common consumption set X and the individuals' profile of initial endowments i and utility functionsˆ i , which is an extension of the original economy E = ( , F), i , i i∈N where i = i • for each i ∈ N . Lemma 3.1. If : R( ) → R is continuous and (strictly) (quasi) concave on R( ), then functionˆ : X → R of the formˆ = • is weakly* continuous and (strictly) (quasi) concave.
Proof. Let { f q } be a net in X that converges weakly* to f ∈ X . Since each measure k is absolutely continuous with respect to , there exists
The (strict) (quasi)concavity ofˆ follows immediately from that of and the affinity of the mapping
To prove this lemma, we borrow from functional analysis the following characterization of weakly* compact sets. 
The proof of the nonnegativity of f i is similar. Hence, n i=1 f i = 1 and f i ∈ X for each i ∈ N , which yields ( f 1 , ... , f n ) ∈ A. The weak* compactness of A follows from Proposition 3.1. ç
To explore the notion of fuzzy core allocations for E = X , i ,ˆ i i∈N , we introduce a set-valued mapping K t : X → 2 X , an eligible extension of K t : F → 2 F , as follows. For f ∈ X and t ∈ [0, 1], we define:
It follows from the definition that
An e S -allocation is simply said to be an S-allocation.
Thus, the notion of S -allocations introduced here is a consistent extension of that of S -partitions to L ∞ -spaces.
Definition 3.4. A fuzzy coalition S improves upon
An allocation that cannot be improved upon by any fuzzy coalition is a fuzzy core allocation.
When commodities are homogeneous and divisible as in classical exchange economies, the usual definition of an S -allocation is an allocation ( f 1 , ... , f n ) such that:
(See [2, 3, 12, 14] .) Although the definition of S -allocations in the sense of (3.1) seems to make sense in the extended economy E, it is inadequate in that it cannot be reduced to the corresponding definition of S -partitions in the original economy E. To illustrate how this definition malfunctions, consider for n = 2 any fuzzy coalition = ( 1 , 2 ) ∈ [0, 1] 2 with 1 2 . Restricting the definition of -allocations in the sense of (3.1) to the characteristic functions ( A 1 , A 2 ) with
, which is true if and only if A 1 = 1 and A 2 = 2 . So, every -partition with 1 2 in the sense of (3.1) consists of only the initial partition ( 1 , 2 ). Fuzziness entirely disappears from the definition.
Existence of fuzzy core allocations
The NTU game for exchange economies
Let N = 2 N \ {∅}. The market game V : N → 2 R n with NTU for the exchange economy E = X , i ,ˆ i i∈N is given by
By construction, V (S) is the utility possibility set of the players (individuals) in S in which payoff vectors are attainable via some fuzzy coalition S . The core C(V ) of V is given by 1
Proposition 4.1. If for an exchange economy E = ( , F), i , i i∈N , utility function i is of the form i = i • such that i : R( ) → R is continuous and quasiconcave for each i ∈ N , then C(V ) is nonempty.
Proof. By the celebrated theorem of Scarf [25] , the core of the NTU game V is nonempty if V is comprehensive below and balanced, V (S) is closed and bounded from above for every S ∈ N , and x = (x 1 , ... , x n ) ∈ R n , y = (y 1 , ... , y n ) ∈ V (S) and x i = y i for each i ∈ S imply x ∈ V (S). We show that V satisfies these conditions.
It is easy to see that each V (S) is comprehensive from below, i.e., x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n , y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ V (S) and x i ≤ y i for each i ∈ N imply x ∈ V (S). Moreover, x ∈ R n , y ∈ V (S) and x i = y i for each i ∈ S imply x ∈ V (S). Since eachˆ i is weakly* continuous by Lemma 3.1, and hence, bounded on the weakly* compact set X , for each S ∈ N there exists M S ∈ R such that x i ≤ M S for every x ∈ V (S) and i ∈ S.
We shall show that V is a balanced game. To this end, let B be a balanced family in N with balanced weights { S ≥ 0|S ∈ B} and let B i = {S ∈ B|i ∈ S}. We then have S∈B i S = 1 for each i = 1, ... , n. Define:
Then, we have:
Choose any x = (x 1 , ... , x n ) ∈ S∈B V (S). Then, for every S ∈ B, there exists an 
Then we have (ˆ 1 (g 1 ), . . . ,ˆ n (g n )) ∈ V (S) and x i <ˆ i (g i ) for each i ∈ S, which contradicts the fact that (x 1 , ... , x n ) is in C(V ). ç
Existence of fuzzy core partitions
Let x = (x 1 , ... , x n ) be in C(V ) and define the set C x by
It is easy to verify that C x is a subset of the set of fuzzy core allocations for E = X , i ,ˆ i i∈N .
Proposition 4.2. If for an exchange economy E = ( , F), i , i i∈N , utility function i is of the form i = i • such that i : R( ) → R is continuous and quasiconcave for each i ∈ N , then there exists a partition
The proof of the proposition is essentially based on the ingenious technique of Lindenstrauss [18] , yielding that an extreme point of C x is indeed a measurable partition of (see also [1] ).
Let K be a nonempty subset of a Banach space X . A point f ∈ K is an extreme point of K if it is not a proper convex combination of two points in K , i.e., f = f 0 + (1 − ) f 1 with f 1 , f 2 ∈ K and ∈ (0, 1) implies f 0 = f 1 .
The following result is a special case of the Krein-Milman theorem (see [8, Lemma V.8.2] ).
Theorem 4.1 (Krein-Milman). A nonempty weakly* compact subset of a Banach space has extreme points.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Note that C x is nonempty, convex and weakly* compact by Proposition 4.1, and Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2. According to the Krein-Milman theorem, C x has an extreme point ( f 1 , ... , f n ). We shall show that each of f i is a characteristic function. Suppose to the contrary, that f i is not a characteristic function for some i ∈ N . By virtue of that ( f 1 , ... , f n ) ∈ A, we may assume without loss of generality that there exist > 0 and A ∈ F with (A) > 0 such that < f 1 , f 2 < 1 − on A. It follows from the Lyapunov's convexity theorem that there exists a measurable
which means that ( f 1 , ... , f n ) is a convex combination of the distinct elements ( Since a fuzzy core partition is a core partition, Theorem 4.2 is an extension of Hüsseinov [15] and Sagara and Vlach [24] , the former proved the existence of core partitions for the case, where utility functions of the individuals are continuous quasiconcave transformations of a finite-dimensional nonatomic vector measure and the latter for the case of concave measures.
Optimality and supporting prices
In this section we characterize (weak) Pareto optimal allocations for an extended exchange economy E = X , i , i i∈N in terms of supporting prices. Under the continuity, quasiconcavity and strict monotonicity assumptions on utility functions, the supportability of allocations by prices is shown to be equivalent to Pareto optimality. This observation leads to the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics for the present model: every Pareto optimal allocation is a competitive equilibrium with transfers of economy E = ( , F), i , i i∈N . For the existence of competitive equilibria for E = ( , F), i , i i∈N in a more general setting, see Hüsseinov [17] .
Existence of supporting prices
Let ba( , F, ) be the vector subspace of ba( , F) whose elements vanish at every A ∈ F with (A) = 0. Then, ba( , F, ) is the dual space of L ∞ ( , F, ) (see [8, Theorem IV.8.16] ).
It is easy to see that every (fuzzy) core allocation for E = X , i ,ˆ i i∈N is weakly Pareto optimal. As shown below, Pareto optimality and weak Pareto optimality coincide whenever each i satisfies continuity.
A function : Proof. It is evident that Pareto optimality implies weak Pareto optimality. We show the converse implication. Let  ( f 1 , . .. , f n ) be an allocation for E that is not Pareto optimal. Then, there is an allocation (g 1 , . . . , g n ) such that
As j is strictly monotonic, there exists A ∈ F with (A) > 0 on which g j is positive. The mutual absolute continuity of 1 , ... , m yields k (A) > 0 for each k = 1, ... , m. By the weak* continuity ofˆ j established in Lemma 3.1, there is ∈ (0, 1) such
It is easy to see that 0 To prove the theorem, we need the following lemma, whose proof is postponed to Appendix. F, ) , i ,ˆ i i∈N the extension of the economy E. Allocations for E are precisely those for E and supporting prices for E are those for E. This observation is employed in the sequel.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Assume that an allocation ( f 1 , . . . , f n ) for an extended economy E = X , i ,ˆ i i∈N has a positive supporting price ∈ ba( , F, ). Also, suppose by way of contradiction that ( f 1 , ... , f n ) is not Pareto optimal. Then by Proposition 5.1, there exists another allocation (g 1 , ... , g n ) for E such thatˆ i ( f i ) <ˆ i (g i ) for each i ∈ N . By the supportability of , we have (
By the weak* continuity ofˆ i established in Lemma 3.1, there is ∈ (0, 1) such thatˆ i ( f i ) <ˆ i ( g i ) for each i ∈ N . Again, by the supportability of , we obtain ( f i ) ≤ (g i ) = ( f i ), which yields ( f i ) = 0 for each i ∈ N , and hence, 0
Conversely, let ( f 1 , . . . , f n ) be a Pareto optimal allocation for E. Then, it is likewise a Pareto optimal allocation for the extended economy E.
Sinceˆ i is quasiconcave, G i is convex, and hence, G is also convex. We shall show that
view of v > 0 and the strict monotonicity ofˆ i proven in Lemma 5.1. This contradicts the (weak) Pareto optimality of ( f 1 , . . . , f n ).
It follows from the separation theorem (see [8, Theorem V.1.12] ) that there exist a nonzero element ∈ ba( , F, ) and a constant a ∈ R such that F, ) . However, since (0) = 0 and is continuous at the origin in the norm topology of L ∞ ( , F, ), there exists > 0 such that | ( f )| < −a for every f ∈ L ∞ ( , F, ) with f ∞ < , a contradiction. Hence, a = 0. We claim that is positive. Suppose to the contrary, that (A) < 0 for some A ∈ F. Let f ∈ int L ∞ + ( , F, ) be arbitrary and take > 0 sufficiently small so that (A)
By the separation property in the above, ( f i ) ≤ (g) must hold. Therefore, is a nonnegative supporting price for ( f 1 , . . . , f n ) for E. ç
Supporting prices in L 1
As observed by Bewley [5, p. 516] , "one could call any element of ba a price system, but since those elements of ba not belonging to L 1 have no economic interpretation, we will be interested only in equilibria with price systems in L 1 
as q → ∞. Hence, f j A q is weakly* convergent to f j in L ∞ ( , F, ). 2 Let > 0 be arbitrary. Since f j A q + → f + in the weak* topology of L ∞ ( , F, ) as q → ∞, by the weak* continuity ofˆ j and the strict monotonicity ofˆ j , we haveˆ j ( f j ) <ˆ j ( f j A q + ) for all sufficiently large q. By the supportability of for E, we have
Since > 0 was arbitrary, we obtain 0 < ( f j ) ≤ 0, a contradiction. Suppose thatˆ i ( f i ) ≤ˆ i ( f ). Take any > 0. Since f A q + → f + in the weak* topology of L ∞ ( , F, ) as q → ∞, by the weak* continuity ofˆ i and the strict monotonicity ofˆ i , we haveˆ i ( f i ) <ˆ i ( f A q + ) for all sufficiently large q. Since is a supporting price for allocation ( f 1 , ... , f n ) for E, we have ( f i ) ≤ ( f A q + ), and hence
where the last inequality employs the fact that 0 ≤ f A q ≤ f and c ≥ 0. Since > 0 was arbitrary, we obtain c ( f i ) ≤ c ( f ). Therefore, c is a positive supporting price in L 1 ( , F, ). ç
The above proof demonstrates that a supporting price is decomposed uniquely into a countably additive part c and a purely finitely additive part p , and p is negligible in the valuation of the Pareto optimal allocation. The supporting price c has the Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to . Therefore, c is represented by a state-dependent price p : → R in L 1 ( , F, ) , where the value of a piece A ∈ F is calculated via the integral c (A) It is easy to verify thatˆ preserves the continuity and strict monotonicity properties of . To demonstrate the quasiconcavity ofˆ , let, for instance, x ∈ D and x ∈ c + R m ++ , and assume that y = t x + (1 − t)x ∈ D for t ∈ [0, 1]. We then haveˆ (x) ≤ˆ (x ∨ y) =ˆ (y) ≤ˆ (c) ≤ˆ (x ), where x ∨ y is the coordinatewise maximum of x and y in R m . Hence, min{ˆ (x),ˆ (x )} =ˆ (x) ≤ˆ (y). The other cases can be checked easily. ç
Since we have assumed that the component measures of = ( 1 , . . . , m ) are mutually absolutely continuous, for every x ∈ R( ) with x ( ), we have x> ( ). Taking into account this observation, Lemma 5.1 can be deduced from Proposition A.1.
If : C → R is continuous, concave and monotonic, then an extension˜ : R m + → R of , preserving its properties, is given bỹ (x) = max{ (y) | y ∈ C, y ≤ x}.
This extension was suggested by Einy et al. [11] . Unfortunately, when is continuous, quasiconcave and strictly monotonic, the extension˜ to R m + does not necessarily preserve its properties (strict monotonicity might be violated). We have exploited this extension not on the entire domain R m + , but on D in the proof of Proposition A.1. For a general treatment of extensions of continuous, (strictly) monotonic functions, see Hüsseinov [16] .
